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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are the owner of a large pharmaceutical company in the United
States. You have spent enormous amounts of money and time in developing a new
and useful drug. Patent ownership provides protection for your business so that as
your company grows, you have more money to invest in research and development
of new drugs. To your surprise, you find that you are slowly losing control of your
patent because you are being forced by foreign governments to allow others to use
1
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your patented products without your consent. As a result, profits are diminished
and control of your product weakened. This is an example of what results when
governments abusively issue compulsory licenses. Regardless of how one thinks
healthcare within the United States should be provided for, in the area of
healthcare innovation, the United States has contributed more than any other
country.2 Because of this fact, the United States healthcare industry stands to be
disproportionately burdened unless changes are made to international compulsory
licensing procedures and investors start critically analyzing the policies of the
countries where they choose to invest.
A compulsory license is a controversial legal instrument, which provides a
unique exception to copyright law. Essentially, a compulsory license is an
involuntary contract between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller, which is
enforced by a state government.3 Generally under a compulsory license,
authorization is given to a manufacturer to produce a patented product without the
patent-holder’s permission.4 This severe limitation on the rights of patent holders
has increasingly been used in the health care arena by countries wishing to produce
pharmaceuticals at a reduced cost in the name of public health. 5 With the addition
of an amendment (“Article 31bis”) to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
framework,6 developed countries are now allowed to grant compulsory licenses to
domestic manufacturers who can then export pharmaceuticals to developing
countries – one of the main problems that patent systems are designed to protect
against.7 While compulsory licenses may be needed in dire situations, there is a
risk that vague language within compulsory licensing law will allow the system to
be misused and abused. Ultimately, the United States pharmaceutical industry will
absorb the greatest burden.
With that in mind, this note will examine why the international compulsory
2
JOSEPH DIMASI, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG INNOVATION: THIRTY-FIVE SUMMARY CASE
HISTORIES ON PRIVATE SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCE (2008), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/mpr_06.htm (noting that from 1982-2003 American drug
makers produced a greater number of first-in-class drugs than European producers, despite Europe’s
larger population).
3
See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and The Reality,
PTC Research Foundation of the Franklin Pierce Law Center, IDEA: J.L. & TECH. (1993); Carlos M.
Correa, Bilateral Investment Agreements: Agents of New Global Standards for the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights? (Aug. 2004), http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=186 (“A compulsory
license is an authorization given by the government for the use by a third party, without consent of the
right holder, of a patent or other intellectual property rights”); Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The
Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45
AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 283 n.1 (2008) (“The term ‘compulsory license’ can refer to any compelled
relaxation of an intellectual property owner’s right to exclude in exchange for a licensee’s payment”).
4
See Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42 GA. L. REV.
131, 133 (2008).
5
See Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements:
Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331 (2004).
6
See Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7
J. INT’L ECON. L. 73 (2004) (the November 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health was adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001 in Doha on November 14,
2001. It reaffirmed flexibility of TRIPS member states in circumventing patent rights for better access
to essential medicines.).
7
See id.
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licensing failures will disproportionately effect the United States pharmaceutical
industry in the future, why more comprehensive and defined guidelines for
implementation are needed, and how pharmaceutical companies can protect
themselves using bilateral investment treaties. To this end, Section I provides a
general description of intellectual property rights as they currently exist
worldwide. Next, Section II provides an overview of the WTO compulsory
licensing scheme and its amendment, Article 31bis. Section III explores the
implications specific to American pharmaceutical companies. Against this
backdrop, Section IV outlines the recent uses of compulsory licenses that have
been harmful to pharmaceutical businesses in the United States, and how Article
31bis’s application could be abused. Finally, Section V will provide general policy
suggestions for making amendments that will allow for increased protection of
patent rights, and how bilateral investment treaties can be used as an alternative
means of settling disputes for American companies investing abroad.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF COMPULSORY LICENSES
A. The Modern Patent System
While organized patent systems are relatively modern developments, the
basic rights trace back hundreds of years and were first recognized in 15th century
Venice as an essential innovation in property law. 8 Today, the patent system in the
United States is given effect by the Constitution. 9 Article I, Section 8, authorizes
Congress to grant exclusive rights to authors and inventors for their respective
discoveries for a limited time.10 A patent in the United States, grants the patent
holder a twenty-year monopolistic right over his invention, during which time no
one, absent authorization by the patent holder, may make, use, or sell the patented
product.11 In exchange for this exclusive right, the patent holder pays his due to
society by disclosing the technical specifications relating to how the invention was
created, and at the end of the twenty-year period, the protection expires allowing
the patented invention to enter the public domain for open production and nonexclusive use.12
Outside of the United States, many countries have similar patent protections,
the enforcement of which is governed by national laws and international treaties. 13
Most businesses from the United States making investments in foreign countries
rely on national patent laws, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), and other
international investment agreements, including the WTO, to protect private
investments.14 Most BITs provide a comprehensive listing of the types of
8
See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 118
(4th ed. 2007).
9
See id.
10
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries”).
11
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 118.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
Id.
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protected intellectual property as well as detailed arbitration clauses. 15 However,
the extent to which rights guaranteed through BITs are actually enforced and
protected is unclear as there has yet to be a publicly reported decision concerning
an intellectual property right protected within a BIT.16 Nonetheless, as foreign
investments and the number of treaties increase, future arbitration in this area is
inevitable.17 In our increasingly globalized world, intellectual property, especially
in the realm of pharmaceuticals, has become a huge business.18 Indeed, it has been
suggested that international patent rights “have never been more economically and
politically important . . . than they are today.”19
In the area of foreign direct investment intellectual property rights empower
pharmaceutical companies with the legal protection required to stay profitable in
foreign markets.20 The exclusivity provided by the patent is unique in its ability to
protect foreign investors from illegal copying, and is therefore essential for
pharmaceutical companies investing abroad.21 One commentator observed that for
a single drug to enter the market, an average of one billion dollars is spent first in
research and development.22 The cost of production, distribution, and marketing
of a drug usually pales in comparison to this front-end investment making the
pharmaceutical industry particularly vulnerable to patent infringement and
compulsory licensing.23 Having the ability to leverage a product through patent
protection is essential for pharmaceutical companies who rely primarily on
innovative research and development to stay competitive.24

15
In most BITs, the term “investment,” incorporates almost any kind of business related activity.
See Mahnaz Malik, Recent Developments in the Definition of Investment in International Investment
Agreements, available at www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/dci_recent_dev.pdf.
16
Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5, at 352; Tsai-Yu Lin, Compulsory Licenses for
Access to Medicines, Expropriation and Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment
Agreements – Are There Issues Beyond the TRIPS Agreement?, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 152 (2009) (noting that to date “no claim regarding compulsory licenses has been
brought before investor-state arbitration and led to an arbitral award”).
17
Id.
18
See Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5, at 333.
19
FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS IN LIGHT OF U.S. FEDERAL LAW, Issue Paper No. 12 (Feb. 2006).
20
See Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: ‘Adequate Remuneration’ for Non-Voluntary Patent
Licensing, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 937 (2008).
21
Christopher S. Gibson, Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: Balancing Concerns
of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Standards, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1403,
1428 (2007) (explaining the importance of patent protection for businesses whose primary product is
rooted in intellectual property).
22
Ronald A. Cass, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Exception that Ate the
Rule? 16-17 (D.C. Legal Found., Working Paper Series No. 150, 2007), available at http://www.
wlf.org/upload/casswpCover.pdf.
23
See id.; Richard J. Hunter, Compulsory Licensing: A Major Issue in International Business
Today?, 11 EUR. J. SOC. SCI. 370 (2009) (noting that because of the increasing complexity of the
chronic and degenerative diseases that have become the main targets of pharmaceutical research and
development, it now takes an average of ten to fifteen years to bring a new drug from the laboratory to
market, at a cost of more than $500 million); see also Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an
Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. ___ (forthcoming
Fall 2010) (explaining that “[t]he pharmaceutical industry is [a] prototypical patent-sensitive industry”).
24
See Hunter, supra note, 23 at 371.
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B. Compulsory Licenses
A compulsory license provides a government with the authority to exercise
one or more of the exclusive rights without having to obtain the patent holder’s
permission to do so.25 The use of compulsory licensing has been recognized
internationally for more than 125 years, however in recent years there has been a
distinct expansion in scope.26 The Paris Convention, dating from 1883,27 first
recognized compulsory licensing as a means to address the abusive exercise of
patent rights on “failure to work” grounds, thereby justifying issuance in limited
cases.28 Through a compulsory license, a government authority interferes directly
with a privately owned patent to authorize its use by the government or by one or
more third parties, subject to certain terms. 29 For example, a compulsory license
might be issued by a government agency with conditions, such as removing
restrictions on the use for which the license is authorized, specifying which third
parties are entitled to use the patent, imposing time restrictions on the use, and

25

See Cahoy, supra note 4, at 133.
ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES 274
(University of Chicago Press 1st ed. 2009) (noting that while the idea of compulsory licensing “seems
to have originated as a serious proposition in the 1830s . . . [its] predecessors can be traced back into the
eighteenth century”).
27
MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 120; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
art. 5(A), Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538 provides that:
(1) Importation by the patentee into the country where the patent has been
granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the Union shall not
entail forfeiture of the patent.
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for
example, failure to work.
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the
grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the said
abuses. No proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be
instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant of the first
compulsory license.
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work
or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the
date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the grant of
the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee
justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be
non–exclusive and shall not be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a
sub–license, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits
such license.
Id.
28
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5(A), Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1538. The Paris Convention originally sought to prevent the patentee from denying public access to
novel intellectual property, where to withhold such information would be unreasonable or contrary to
public policy. Id. Under Article 5 of the Paris Convention, an applicant could apply for a
nonexclusive, nontransferable compulsory license for the use of an invention in the public interest on
the grounds of “failure to work” or “insufficient working” before the expiration of three years from the
date of application for the patent, or four years from the date of the grant of the patent whichever period
expires last. Id. However, the Paris Convention allowed a compulsory license application to be denied
if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Id.
29
Cahoy, supra note 4, at 133.
26
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specifying payment of compensation to the IP owner. 30 The purpose of a
compulsory license, in the pharmaceutical context, is presumably to increase
access to essential medicines by providing a broader use of the invention than
intended by the original patent holder.31 As a result however, the patent holder is
forced to give up a large amount of control of the patent for the alleged benefit of
the larger public.32
Despite the centrality of exclusive rights within the intellectual property
system, the compulsory license claims to provide a safety valve for occasions
where there is an overriding public interest. 33 The compulsory license thus enables
a government to make an exception to the exclusive protection by allowing usage
of the patent for itself or a third party on certain conditions it deems appropriate. 34
Given the powerful nature of compulsory licenses, it is easy to see that if misused,
there is a potential threat to the security of private property, as well as
innovation.35 In this regard, a compulsory license can be compared to a
governmental taking of real property by use of eminent domain power as seen in
the United States Supreme Court decision Kelo v. City of New London.36 Like a
governmental taking, a compulsory license can considerably erode the confidence
in private property and protected innovations. 37
The use of a compulsory license often triggers WTO trade law
considerations. Most of the scholarly commentary concerning the use of
compulsory licensing has focused on international trade laws and public health
issues.38 The most relevant commentary is focused on the WTO’s Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (“TRIPS Agreement”), which sets
conditions for the issuance of a compulsory license in Article 31.39 Additionally,
30

See Taubman, supra note 20, at 947.
Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5, at 331.
Cahoy, supra note 4, at 141-42.
33
See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to
Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389 (2002).
34
See id.
35
See Gibson, supra note 21, at 1-3 (an expansion of interference by a government polity through
compulsory licensing has the potential to substantially diminish security in intellectual property rights).
36
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In Kelo, the Supreme Court ruled that state
and local governments should be given broad deference in deciding to take private property to use for
private economic development projects. Id.
37
Cass, supra note 22, at 2 (comparing the government interference in private property to the
effects of indirect expropriation through the use of a compulsory license and noting that “the security of
private property is substantially reduced if government can take it by force for any and every use the
authorities want”).
38
See, e.g., Sandra Bartelt, Compulsory Licenses Pursuant to TRIPS Article 31 in the Light of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 6 J. WORLD INT’L PROP. 283 (2003);
KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM SWEDISH NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, THE WTO DECISION ON COMPULSORY
LICENSING: DOES IT ENABLE IMPORT OF MEDICINES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH GRAVE
PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEMS? (2008), available at http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/Arbet
somr%C3%A5den/WTO/Handel%20och%20skydd%20f%C3%B6r%20immateriella%20r%C3%A4ttig
heter%20-%20TRIPS/Rapport%20The_WTO_decision_on_compulsory_licensing.pdf [hereinafter
National Board of Trade].
39
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The TRIPS
Agreement was created as a result of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations
and contains rules on patents and other forms of intellectual property. Id. Adherence to the TRIPS
31

32
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the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Article
31bis”), a statement of intent adopted by the WTO in 2001, serves as a companion
to the TRIPS Agreement, although there has yet to be a formal amendment. 40
Article 31bis clarifies and confirms that member states have the right to grant
compulsory licenses to protect public health and gives broad discretion to do so.41
The general purpose of Article 31 is to allow any WTO Member to issue a
compulsory license after fulfilling certain requirements 42 – many of which are
unclear or subject to broad interpretation.43 Interestingly, nowhere within Article
31 of the TRIPS Agreement do the words “compulsory license” appear. 44
However, in reference to patent usage Article 31 does allow for “use without
authorization of the right holder,” thus allowing a compulsory license to be
issued.45 Before a country can grant a compulsory license each license must be
“considered on its individual merits;”46 attempts to obtain authorization from the
right holder on reasonable commercial grounds must have failed;47 the compulsory
license must be limited in scope and duration to the purpose for which it was
issued;48 the license must be used “predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market” of country issuing the license; 49 and lastly the owner of the patent must be
“paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account
the economic value of the authorization.” 50 These requirements are much too
lenient and imprecise to protect the interests of countries with legitimate
pharmaceutical patents.
Agreement means that all WTO member states, in theory, must maintain a minimum level of
intellectual property protection. Cass, supra note 22, at 12-13. The TRIPS Agreement was developed in
response to “concerns in developed nations that the intellectual property rights of their nationals were
not sufficiently respected internationally and that remedies for addressing derogations from intellectual
property rights were not sufficiently strong.” Id. The TRIPS Agreement “is to date the most
comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property.” See World Trade Organization,
Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2010).
40
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; see also
Catherine Saez, Drug Access Waiver Debate Looms for June TRIPS Council Meeting, Intellectual
Property Watch, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/05/31/drug-access-waiver-debatelooms-for-june-trips-council-meeting/ (commenting on recent consultations between WTO members
who are discussing expanding the scope the Doha Declaration, and noting the difficulties of holding a
technical workshop to evaluate the “paragraph 6” amendment because of the widely differing views on
the outcome).
41
See World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003,
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/L/540 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter Implementation of Paragraph 6]. The 2003 decision ratified the
Doha Declaration and created a special mechanism for compulsory licenses to enhance access to
patented pharmaceuticals by counties with limited manufacturing capabilities. See Bartelt, supra note
38.
42
See National Board of Trade, supra note 38.
43
Hunter, supra note 23, at 372.
44
See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 31.
45
World Trade Organization, Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm00_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
46
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 31(a).
47
See id., art. 31(b).
48
See id., art. 31(c)-(e), (g).
49
Id. art., 31(f).
50
Id. art., 31(h).
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The language of Article 31 gives wide deference to WTO members in
deciding what grounds a compulsory license can be used, no longer referring
strictly to failure to adequately use the patent in the market as the only
justification.51 In addition to this broad deference, Article 31 provides several
potential reasons for authorizing a compulsory license. First, Article 31(b)
suggests that a national emergency, circumstances of extreme urgency, or public
non-commercial use could justify issuance of a compulsory license. 52 Next,
Article 31(k) provides that a compulsory license may be used to correct anticompetitive behavior such as “failure to work.” 53 And lastly, Article 31(l) allows a
compulsory license for the use of an essential “second patent,” which cannot be
exploited without infringing on another “first patent.”54 In this case, the
compulsory license is allegedly justified only where the second patent involves an
important technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to
the invention claimed in the first patent.55
The use of a compulsory license will only be permitted if there have been
unsuccessful efforts to obtain authorization from the patent holder – which requires
reasonable commercial terms and the commencement of negotiations for a
reasonable period of time. 56 However, the requirement of a reasonable negotiation
period will be waived for a WTO Member country under three scenarios: (1) in the
case of a national emergency, (2) other circumstances of extreme urgency, or (3) in
cases of public non-commercial use.57 Lastly, and possibly most contentious,
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement states that after a WTO Member nation is
authorized to issue a compulsory license, the use must be limited to the “supply of
the domestic market.”58
Article 31(f) has been sharply criticized as being too restrictive because
pharmaceutical production is predominantly concentrated in high-income
countries, and many developing countries lack the capacity for pharmaceutical
production entirely.59 Article 31(f), therefore, allegedly acted to prevent countries
with insufficient or non-existent pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities from

51

See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39. Notably, Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement
clarifies that a WTO member state’s national law may provide “limited exceptions” to exclusive rights,
“provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties.” Such exceptions include de minimis and educational uses. See id.
52
See id., art. 31(b), (k), (l). While these exceptions provide some guidance, it is worth noting that
nowhere in the text of Article 31 does the WTO provide definitions for “national emergency,”
“circumstances of extreme urgency,” or “public non-commercial use.” See generally id.
53
See id., art. 31(k).
54
See id., art. 31(l).
55
Id.
56
National Board of Trade, supra note 38, at 7.
57
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 31(b).
58
Id., art. 31(f).
59
Vera Zolotaryova, Are We There Yet? Taking “TRIPS” To Brazil and Expanding Access to
HIV/AIDS Medication, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1099, 1103 (2008) (noting that because certain nonepidemic conditions are now seen as an urgent enough health emergency to necessitate a compulsory
license, the use of compulsory licenses is likely to increase worldwide to the exclusion of countries with
little or no manufacturing capabilities).
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issuing compulsory licenses.60 In response to the human rights activists’ outcry on
this matter, the Ministerial Conference of the WTO met in Doha Qatar in 2001,
and developed a Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
commonly known as the Doha Declaration. 61 The Doha Declaration was made
effective in 2005 when an amendment was added to Article 31 known as Article
31bis, inserting the language from the Doha Declaration and an Annex to the WTO
Article 31 framework.62 The amendment was composed of three waivers under
Article 31.63 The result of these waivers was to significantly ease the requirements
that production be “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.” 64 This
change is significant because the exporting countries’ duty under Article 31(f) is
now waived, thereby allowing compulsory licenses to be produced in one country
and then exported to another.65 Additionally, under this new framework, only the
exporting country is responsible for adequate remuneration. 66 The result is that
multiple countries are benefiting from the compulsory license, but the
responsibility is borne solely by the exporting country – thus creating an incentive
for countries with manufacturing capabilities to urge those without to acquire
compulsory licenses. Similarly, re-export of the pharmaceutical produced under
the license is allowed among members of a regional trade agreement. 67 This
60
Id. at 1107. WTO member countries with no manufacturing capabilities were unable to make use
of the compulsory licensing scheme for lack of production capabilities. Id. at 1108. Without the ability
to manufacture pharmaceuticals within their own country a compulsory license did not serve to alleviate
the problem. Id. at 1107.
61
Doha Declaration, supra note 40.
62
The Doha Declaration was implemented shortly after the U.S. considered issuing a compulsory
license in order to get sufficient amounts of Anthrax antibiotics claiming an epidemic situation. See
Fact Sheet, supra note 35.
63
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, at 7.
64
See Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 41.
65
See Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at 6 (stating that “[t]he TRIPS Agreement does not and
should not prevent [WTO] Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
emphasized “recogni[tion] that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the
TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem
and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.”).
66
Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 41. The WTO General Council affirmed that
Paragraph 6 should be implemented to allow countries with limited manufacturing capabilities, to issue
compulsory licenses to other countries who have manufacturing capabilities and who could then export
the pharmaceuticals to countries lacking production facilities. Notably, under the General Council’s
orders “[t]he obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be
waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory licence [sic] to the extent necessary for the
purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing
Member(s)….” Id.
67
See id.
[W]here a developing or least-developed country WTO Member is a party to a
regional trade agreement within the meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994
and the Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable
[sic] Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries
(L/4903), at least half of the current membership of which is made up of
countries presently on the United Nations list of least developed countries, the
obligation of that Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be
waived to the extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product produced or
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practice expands the reach of Article 31 and diminishes the capacity for the patent
owner to profit in foreign markets – which can lead to a decrease in total foreign
investment.68 These changes create the possibility for compulsory licenses to be
granted such that one country can produce pharmaceuticals for another, opening
the floodgates for potential misuse and further loss of patent control.
Although there had been some debate about whether the grounds on which a
compulsory license can be issued under Article 31 were exclusive, the Doha
Declaration confirmed that member states have the “freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”69 This “freedom” creates a great
deal of subjective power resting with developing nations in the determination of
whether to issue a compulsory license. 70 Similarly, under the new WTO
framework, each member shall have the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency. 71 This deference to
WTO members is far too broad and subjective, and will allow countries to claim
circumstances requiring issuance of compulsory licenses without adequate need or
an unbiased analysis of the situation.
The response to the Doha Declaration in the developed world has not been
positive. The United States agreed not to use the amendment as an importing
member, because it saw the need to protect investments from unauthorized usage72
– this is the correct approach to protect long-term goals of innovation. The broad
text of the TRIPS Agreement was intended to grant each nation the authority to
promote public health, but the new loosely defined language lacks objective
guidelines, and thereby creates an atmosphere for further patent abuses worldwide.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING TO THE UNITED STATES
A. Creating an Environment for Innovation
The United States has contributed to more top diagnostic and therapeutic
innovations than any other country. 73 Similarly, in the area of pharmaceutical
innovations, the United States has produced more than the European Union and
imported under a compulsory licence [sic] in that Member to be exported to the
markets of those other developing or least developed country parties to the
regional trade agreement that share the health problem in question.
Id.
Cass, supra note 22, at 22 (explaining the importance of intellectual property protection as a key
factor to the enormous contribution that innovators have made in recent history, particularly in the area
of human health).
69
Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at para. 5(b).
70
Brent Savoie, Thailand’s Test: Compulsory Licensing in an Era of Epidemiological Transition,
48 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 219 (2007); see also Doha Declaration, supra note 56, at para. 6.
71
See Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at para. 6.
72
Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 158 n.86. Many countries agreed not to use Article 31bis as
importing members because of the fear that implementation would detrimentally diminish patent
protections abroad.
73
Tyler Cowen, Poor U.S. Scores in Health Care Don’t Measure Nobel and Innovation,
N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006 (noting that the “cream of the crop” in contributions to basic medical science
is to count the number of Nobel prizes in medicine and physiology. Of the ninety-five Nobel Prize
recipients for medical related innovations in the past forty years, fifty-seven of them, roughly sixty
percent of the total, were from the United States).
68
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Switzerland combined – in spite of having a smaller total population.74 The
innovator-friendly environment created by a protective patent system in the United
States directly answers the question of why the United States contributes
disproportionately to the production of pharmaceuticals. 75
For example,
approximately forty percent of the United States economic growth is dependent
upon intellectual property protection of some kind. 76 A great example is the Pfizer
Company, currently the world’s largest research-based pharmaceutical company,
employing over 85,000 people, and investing almost sixty billion dollars each year
in the pursuit of new and beneficial treatments. 77
Although many factors are surely relevant to how the United States has
managed to create such a healthy environment for intellectual property, the
predominant contributor is monetary compensation.78 Individuals and firms will
tend to invest more in medical innovation when they can expect larger returns, the
returns sustain for a longer period of time, and when profits are realized without
undue delay.79 These three factors all directly relate to the ease of use and
protective nature of the patent system in the United States, which allows exclusive
protection for twenty years to patent holders.80 In recent years, the United States
has accounted for forty-five percent of worldwide pharmaceutical sales, as
compared to Europe’s twenty-seven to thirty percent and Japan’s nine to twelve
percent.81 The United States attracts high quality innovators mainly because of
monetary incentives.82 The population of Europe is one hundred and fifty percent
larger than the United States, and Japan is forty-two percent larger, so the greater
contribution of the United States cannot be attributed to its population size alone. 83
Additionally, the United States is over-represented as a base of operations for top
pharmaceutical firms.84 Of the top fifteen pharmaceutical firms, measured by
pharmaceutical revenues, eight are based in the United States, six in Europe, and
one in Japan.85 These factors are unlikely to be a coincidence. Although the firms
may have located in the United States for historic reasons, it is most likely that a
superior business climate cultivated by strong patent protection is a major factor –
74

Iain Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Public-private Interaction and the Productivity of
Pharmaceutical Research (Cambridge Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6018,
1997); DIMASI, supra note 2 (analyzing a list of “impact drugs” as those having the most impact on
therapeutic science between 1965 and 1992, combined with a list of the twenty-five most prescribed
drugs in the world).
75
Id.
76
Cowen, supra note 73, at 5 (explaining that intellectual property is used in many areas of
business, but carries significant importance in the pharmaceutical industry).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See Jenna Greve, Healthcare in Developing Countries and the Role of Business: A Global
Governance Framework to Enhance the Accountability of Pharmaceutical Companies, CORP.
GOVERNANCE 2008 WLNR 16938575 (Sep. 7, 2008) (noting that the monopoly power created by a
patent is the cornerstone of many pharmaceutical companies which rely on intellectual property to
survive).
80
Id.
81
JOHN NORTHRUP, THE BUSINESS OF HEALTH CARE INNOVATION (Lawton Robert Burns ed.,
Cambridge University Press 2005).
82
Id.
83
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (1994).
84
NORTHRUP, supra note 81, at 2-3.
85
Id.
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a factor that must also be taken into account when investing abroad.86
B. Bilateral Investment Treaties and the United States
After the Doha Declaration and creation of Article 31bis, the landscape upon
which a compulsory license could be granted changed significantly. 87 A major
question arises: how will the application of Article 31bis affect the future of the
pharmaceutical industry in the United States? In the wake of the Doha
Declaration, much attention was given to investment treaty arbitration, but much
less was written about intellectual property issues arising under BITs,88 and even
less so in relation to claims for expropriation after the issuance of a compulsory
licenses.89 Thus, pharmaceutical companies must now be careful both when
investing within the Unites States, and especially when participating in foreign
direct investments abroad.
Increasingly, investors from the United States may be able to seek recourse
through alternative means of dispute settlement because of threats to business
through the use of compulsory licensing abroad. 90 The WTO’s Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes91 provides for
settlement of trade claims between states, and may be relevant if the state
authorizing the compulsory license has failed to comply with the TRIPS
Agreement’s requirements.92 However, the investor from the United States may
also wish to consider bringing a claim in investor-state arbitration directly against
the host state under the terms of a BIT.93 As compulsory licensing becomes more
common, investors should weigh the benefits of investment arbitration and
potential claims for indirect expropriation.
A majority of intellectual property disputes involve the patent owner suing a
non-contracting party for alleged infringement of the owner’s exclusive patent

86
Rudolph Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property (1981) 75 AM.
J. INT’L L. 553, 580 (especially for international investors, reliance and legitimate expectations
contribute to “a continuous and increased international flow of capital, which…is crucial for the
development and stabilization of the international economy in general, and the economy of developing
countries in particular”).
87
Id. at 581.
88
Correa, Bilateral Investment, supra note 3; UNCTAD, Intellectual Property Provisions in
International Investment Agreements on Regulations and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
INTELL. PROP. Q. UPDATE, at 2 (2006).
89
Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 285.
90
Id. at 286. Bird and Cahoy note that the current dispute-settlement framework provided through
bilateral investment treaties between nations might be the best way to insure greater protections for
United States pharmaceutical companies investing abroad. Id. Bird and Cahoy suggest that in light of
the overly flexible requirements of the WTO’s Article 31, the use of bilateral investment treaties should
be considered as a better means of increased protection. Id.
91
Id.; see World Trade Organization Agreement, Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu
_e/dsu_e.htm (explaining that “[t]he rules and procedures of this Understanding shall also apply to
consultations and the settlement of disputes between Members concerning their rights and obligations
under the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization…and of this
Understanding taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered agreement”).
92
Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 286-87.
93
Id.
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rights.94 Most of these disputes are resolved through litigation between private
parties in the courts of a country where the patent owner has registered with the
national patent office.95 In many cases, the parties to the private litigation have no
prior interaction and have not decided on a settlement framework.96 Without a
prior agreement the parties usually default to private litigation through the national
court system in the country where the investment was made, which may be
nationalistic and generally unfavorable to foreign investors. 97
Understanding the dispute settlement framework will be helpful for investors
from the United States. The possibility of investor-state arbitration offers a unique
avenue to protect intellectual property for pharmaceutical companies engaged in
foreign investment.98 For example, in a claim arising from a WTO member’s
conduct that infringes on exclusive patent usage, such as the use of a compulsory
license, the BIT may provide protection to support a claim brought directly against
the WTO member in an international tribunal.99 Most BITs, which are first
negotiated by two separate government states, contain a dispute resolution clause
in which the contracting governments agree that if an investment dispute arises
with a foreign investor from another contracting state, they will submit to an
international tribunal for arbitration.100 It has been recognized that this significant
increase of consent to arbitration between foreign investors and their host states is
one of the most significant developments in international law in the past forty
years.101 Regardless of the widespread adoption of BITs, there has yet to be a
published case of an investor-state arbitration that has reached a settlement under
the terms of a BIT in an international tribunal. 102 Thus to ensure protection,
investors should be particularly aware of whether their patent has been registered
94

Id.
See 8 CHRISTOPHER GIBSON, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
DISPUTES, THE CALIFORNIA INTERNATIONAL PRACTITIONER (1997).
96
Id.
97
See DAVID W. PLANT, RESOLVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES,15 (1999) (noting that
without an arbitration agreement in place at the time of a dispute, the chances of avoiding the national
court systems are rare); see also Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in
International Law, 20:1 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 34, 34-35 (2005) (explaining that
foreign investors are especially susceptible to regulatory takings because first, “the investor typically
lacks representation in the political process and may not have any input into decisions that significantly
affect its investment. Second, receiving reciprocal advantages in the long-run will not mitigate the
burdens of regulation where the [foreign] investor hopes to recoup its investment in the short term and
to leave the jurisdiction. Third, where government measures result in very severe losses, it is unlikely
that adequate subsequent benefits will be obtained to off-set losses. For example, nationalization
policies are often predicated on the assumption that the foreign investor will be excluded from future
economic participation in the economy. Fourth, economic nationalism is often a popular domestic
policy. The nationality of the foreign investor makes the foreign investment a target for government
measures. Finally, payments of compensation to a foreign investor may be viewed as a political failure,
and are unlikely to be widely supported by the domestic political constituency.”).
98
See Newcombe, supra note 97, at 35.
99
See Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1528-32 (2005).
100
LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 40-45 (2004)
(explaining that the majority of BITs contain provisions allowing for some form of privatized dispute
settlement).
101
R. DOAK BISHOP, FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 31
(2005).
102
Id.
95
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within the host state, as well as the nature of the investment itself and whether the
type of investment has been subject to investor-state arbitration in the past.103 In
the event that a compulsory license is issued, the investor should look to whether
the host-state either violated the broader WTO treaty requirements or whether
there is a more specific claim available under an applicable BIT.104
C. Need for Better Governance of Compulsory Licenses
Some form of compulsory licensing statute is common in the national
systems of many countries, even if not often put to use. 105 The United States is an
example of a country with a limited compulsory licensing structure.106 The
American Intellectual Property Law Association, in comments during the FTC
proceedings concerning Dell, stated that:
The appearance of a United States government agency imposing a compulsory
patent license, especially a royalty-free compulsory license, must be avoided except
in response to egregious conduct. Other countries could cite such an action as the
basis for imposing broad and onerous compulsory licensing requirements upon
United States patentees abroad.107

The various compulsory licensing schemes abroad may have different legal
bases and be authorized subject to varying executive, and administrative or judicial
procedures.108 In practice, sometimes the mere threat of using a compulsory
license is enough to force compliance or a settlement with a pharmaceutical
company.109 The danger of ambiguous compulsory licensing systems resulting in
the loss of intellectual property investments can be seen in an example from Egypt.
Egypt is a country with moderate income and unlimited potential for growth, yet in
spite of this seeming promise, the amount of intellectual property investment from
foreign companies has significantly decreased in the last twenty years.110 In the
103
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Mar. 7-11, 2005, Commission on
Investment, Technology, and Related Financial Issues, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d
62_en.pdf. In the arbitration context, despite the significant expansion of patent-based investments
worldwide disputes between foreign investors and a national government have been limited to
construction, banking, telecommunications, residential utilities, and various other high risk or hazardous
activities. Id. at para. 11.
104
Id.
105
In 2008, there were at least one hundred countries that had licensing laws permitting the
government to authorize compulsory licenses in some form. Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 292.
Compulsory licenses have been granted only in limited circumstances in the United States, usually in
relation to antitrust concerns, such as making the compulsory licensing of a patent a condition for
approval of a merger between two competing businesses within a single market, or ordering a patent
license in order to avoid violations of federal law prohibiting unfair competitive practices. Id.
106
See Federal Trade Commission, American Intellectual Property Law Association, http://www.ftc
.gov/opp/global/aipla.shtm (last updated June 25, 2007).
107
Id.
108
Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 292-93.
109
See Jerome Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions:
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 249-50 (2009) (describing how a number of
governments have “quietly begun to use the threat of compulsory licenses to rein in the prices of
selected medicines”).
110
See International Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (transcript of Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) available
at http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=2f938a1a-7683-4de8-9a3a-022c04251365.
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Middle East, Egypt has one of the worst records in protecting intellectual property
rights, which has been devastating to its ability to increase trade opportunities and
attract foreign investors.111 Two months after Pfizer entered the Egyptian market,
the Egyptian Health Ministry decided to grant a compulsory license to produce
Viagra to all Egyptian companies who applied for the rights to produce the generic
version.112 The generic version of the drug was to be sold at one-twentieth of the
price of Pfizer’s market price.113 These actions by the Egyptian government
diminished Egypt’s capacity to attract future foreign investment. As a result,
Pfizer canceled plans to build an additional production facility in Egypt, 114 and
pharmaceutical company PhRMA followed suit cancelling a three-hundred million
dollar investment.115
The increasing costs of pharmaceuticals come from the expensive research
and development process, which is needed to produce effective and safe drugs. 116
For context, approximately fifty-six percent of funding for global pharmaceutical
research is provided for by the private sector, costing over one-hundred billon
dollars per annum.117 Moreover, most research in the pharmaceutical industry
does not result in patented medicine; therefore pharmaceutical companies must
secure earnings that not only cover their research and development costs, but also
the costs of unsuccessful research.118 A decrease in research would most likely
reduce the rate of medical progress and innovation across the globe.119 The
monopoly power created by a patent is essential for pharmaceutical companies to
earn enough money to stay in business and to finance subsequent research and
development projects.120
When a compulsory license is issued, the private funds have already been
invested into the product, so once the license takes effect, the investment cannot be
taken back.121 Compulsory licenses are retroactive by nature, meaning that the
pharmaceutical is already patented and the patent holder only loses his exclusive
right over the patented product after the compulsory license is issued. 122 The
underlying problem occurs because once the compulsory license is issued, the
incentive to invest in the future is reduced. This foreseeable reduction in
investment could also have a major impact on global health.
Under the Article 31 amendments, each WTO member has the authority to

111
See Abeer Allam, Seeking Investment Egypt Tries Patent Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/04/business/seeking-investment-egypt-tries-patentlaws.html (noting that Egypt’s compulsory licensing statute is overly broad, creating weak protections
for intellectual property).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 306.
115
Id. at 308.
116
See Greve, supra note 79 (explaining that research and development is one of the most time
consuming and costly components of a successful pharmaceutical company).
117
Id. (noting that funding is not primarily coming from the public sector or the government, but
rather from private industry).
118
Id. at 8.
119
Id.
120
See id.
121
Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3.
122
Id.
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grant a compulsory license, and has great discretion for doing so. 123 Generally,
developing nations have weaker intellectual property protections and are therefore
more likely to issue compulsory licenses on patented pharmaceutical products than
are developed countries.124 For fear of not regaining the cost of research and
development, United States pharmaceutical companies will stop devoting their
time and energy into discovering new cures for diseases, which are ironically most
needed in the developing world, and instead focus on more profitable endeavors. 125
IV. RECENT USES OF COMPULSORY LICENSES AND HOW ARTICLE 31BIS
APPLICATION COULD PROVE TO BE PARTICULARLY HARMFUL
A. Recent Uses
Most countries have some national compulsory licensing system in place,
even if rarely used.126 Global health projections leave little doubt that chronic
diseases are rapidly overtaking infectious diseases, such as malaria, AIDS and
tuberculosis, as the world’s deadliest diseases; a shift emphasized by recent World
Health Organization (WHO) reports on global health.127 Many of these chronic
diseases, such as obesity, are best regulated through education, healthy eating, and
regular exercise.128 Yet, in a culture which demands a “quick fix” for everything,
the use of compulsory licenses to fix these chronic problems is not surpising.
While many countries have adopted compulsory licensing statutes and claim
to protect foreign investors, there has been much uncertainty in many cases about
whether a national statute providing for compulsory licenses is in compliance with
the standards from Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 129 To date, there have
been relatively few high-profile grants of compulsory licenses by governmental
authorities for reasons other than antitrust concerns. 130 One of the most
123

Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at 6.
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2008 Special 301 Report 37 (2008), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf. The special report is a tool
used to pinpoint problems in intellectual property rights protection in countries that are engaged in trade
with the United States. Id. A significant number of countries the United States has placed on the
Watch List are developing nations. Id.
125
See Baucus, supra note 110.
126
See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 292.
127
The WTO report said populations are aging partly due to success against infectious diseases, and
changing patterns of food, alcohol and tobacco consumption. World Health Organization, Fact Sheet
No. 311: Obesity & Overweight, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/index.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2011). Fact Sheet No. 311 emphasizes that while deaths from infectious diseases,
maternal conditions and poor nutrition would fall by three percent in the next decade; deaths from
chronic disease will increase by seventy-one percent. Id. Cases of diabetes, heart disease and stroke,
for which major weight gain is a big risk factor, are predicted to rise rapidly as the obesity epidemic
takes hold in the developing world. Id.
128
See Fact Sheet, supra note 45.
129
See Ching-fu Lin, Filling in the Gaps of the TRIPS Agreement: Reflections on the TaiwanPhilips CR-R Compulsory License Case, 3 ASIAN J. WORLD TRADE ORG. & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y
557 (2008) (Lin describes Taiwan’s issuance of a compulsory license under Article 76 of Taiwan’s
Patent Act with respect to Philips’ recordable compact disk patents and argues that both the issuance of
the license and Taiwan’s Patent Act were valid and consistent with Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement). Additionally, the article notes that there has yet to be a WTO arbitration settlement or
official report that directly interprets the language of Article 31. Id.
130
Id.
124
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contentious recent instances involves a compulsory license issued by the Brazilian
government.131 In May 2007, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva signed
a document, which established a compulsory license to enable Brazil to make or
import a generic version of the patented HIV treatment drug, Efavirenz. 132
This case is significant for a number of reasons, one being that before the
compulsory license was issued, Brazil had rejected an offer by the patent owner,
Merk & Co., to voluntarily discount the price for its drug by thirty percent. 133
These decisions by governments unwilling to negotiate on price have been viewed
as controversial, raising concerns by the United States Trade Representative. 134
Rather than claiming a failure to comply with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement,
Merck issued a statement focusing on foreign investment, characterizing the
Brazilian government’s decision to issue the compulsory license as a form of
indirect expropriation.135 Merck stated that “[t]his expropriation of intellectual
property sends a chilling signal to research-based companies about the
attractiveness of undertaking risky research on diseases that affect the developing
world,” and harshly emphasized that “[t]his decision. . .will have a negative impact
on Brazil’s reputation as an industrialized country seeking to attract inward
investment. False”136
Brazil’s issuance of a compulsory license sets a bad example for other
nations because it encourages the use of compulsory licensing provisions for
countries with middle-class income levels purely to lower the cost of
pharmaceuticals.137 Further, Brazil has the twelfth largest economy in the
world,138 a relatively low rate of HIV/AIDS infection, and is better situated to pay
for or produce the medications needed itself compared to poorer countries that are
suffering from HIV/AIDS on an epidemic proportion. 139 In spite of the
pharmaceutical industry’s backlash at Brazil’s actions in issuing compulsory
licenses for its citizens, Brazil has recently proposed expanding the scope of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS framework, making it easier to compel any
kind of drug on the market for generic production at lower cost. 140 Regardless of
131

Jon Cohen, Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma Patents, 316 SCI. MAG. 816 (May 11, 2007),
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/316/5826/816.full.pdf?sid=6ce9c1ef-fa09-4e95-8062-c192d3288a
26 (last visited May 2005).
132
Keith Alcorn, Brazil Issues Compulsory License on Efaverinz, AIDSMAP NEWS (May 7, 2007),
http://www.aidsmap.com/page/1427206/.
133
Id.
134
In April 2007 the U.S. Trade Representative cited the issuing of compulsory licenses as one
reason for elevating countries like Brazil to the Priority Watch List, a U.S. government warning to
countries it judges do not adequately protect intellectual property rights. Id. Indeed, being placed on
the U.S. Trade Representative’s watch list has the effect of deterring future investment and could
potentially lead to increases of export tariffs. Id.
135
Id.
136
Merck & Co., Inc., Statement on Brazilian Government’s Decision to Issue Compulsory License
for Stocrin (May 2007) http://www.drugs.com/new/merck-amp-co-inc-statement-brazillian-government
-s-decision-issue-comulsory-license-stocrin-6088.html.
137
Vera Zolotaryova, Are We There Yet? Taking “TRIPS” To Brazil and Expanding Access to
HIV/AIDS Medication, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1099, 1120 (2008).
138
International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, Brazil Grants Compulsory
License, 11 NEWS & ANALYSIS (May 2007) available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridges/11643.
139
Id.
140
Stephen J. Thiru, Brazil’s Proposal at WIPO on Patent Limitations and Exceptions (SCP/14/7),
http://keionline.org/node/769. On January 20, 2010, Brazil submitted a proposal to the Standing
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Brazil’s intentions and claims of suffering from a legitimate emergency, the
requirement under Article 31, that countries must first try to negotiate with patent
owners before granting compulsory licenses should not be so easily waived or
should, at the very least, require additional objective standards.
Likewise, in Thailand the government has issued compulsory licenses for
multiple kinds of pharmaceutical drugs. The first was for the same drug used in
Brazil, Efavirenz; next it was for Kaletra, which is also used to treat HIV/AIDS,
and lastly for Plavix, which is used to treat cardiovascular conditions such as heart
disease.141 The issuance of a compulsory license for Plavix in Thailand is
significant for a number of reasons. First, Thailand, like Brazil, is a middleincome country, and better situated to pay the market price for needed
medications.142 However, nowhere in the TRIPS Article 31 framework does the
WTO consider the income level of member states when determining whether to
issue a compulsory license.143 Secondly, Thailand’s compulsory license for Plavix
was the first of its kind issued for a chronic disease rather than an infectious
disease.144 Breaking ground in this area, the Thai government has lowered the bar
to allow all kinds of patented medications to be considered for compulsory
licensing.145 Furthermore, Thailand issued the compulsory license for Plavix
under Article 31’s exception for public non-commercial use rather than the
national emergency exception,146 which is yet to be defined by the WTO.147
This usage, therefore, has significantly widened the scope in terms of which
ailments are considered severe enough by the WTO to compel an unwilling patent
owner to issue a license.148 To make matters worse, at the time Thailand issued
the compulsory license for Kaletra, the pharmaceutical company who owned the
patent was already selling the drug to Thailand at a discounted price.149
Interestingly, because Thailand issued the compulsory license under the public
non-commercial use exception, Article 31(b) waives the normal WTO requirement
that the member state must first make reasonable efforts to participate in
negotiations with the patent holder before issuing a compulsory license. 150

Committee on the Law of Patents, citing the historically limited use of currently existing patent
exceptions as justification for expansion of compulsory licensing. Id.
141
See Press Release, Abbott Laboratories, Thailand Abbott Laboratories Won’t Introduce New
Drugs in Thailand due to Breaking of Patent (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.aegis.org/news/ads/2007/
AD070549.html [hereinafter Abbott Press Release].
142
Zolotaryova, supra note 137, at 1108.
143
See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39.
144
See Abbott Press Release, supra note 141. The significance of issuing compulsory licenses for
chronic illnesses, such as heart disease, is that these diseases are found worldwide and are best treated
by changes in diet and exercise. Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/en/index.html; see also infra Section
IV.B.
145
Id.
146
Zolotaryova, supra note 137, at 1109.
147
Simon Montlake, Thailand Widens Scope of Generic Drugs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 31,
2007), http:/www.csmonitor.com/2007/0231/p07s02-woap.html.
148
Id.
149
See Abbott Press Release, supra note 141.
150
See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, Article 31(b) (explaining that WTO members
are not required to negotiate with the lawful patent holder if the country is using the patent for a “public
non-commercial use”).
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The examples from Thailand and Brazil display the unfortunate truth that the
compulsory licensing system under the WTO framework has the potential to
infringe on the proper functioning of the pharmaceutical markets and world
health.151 As pharmaceutical companies realize the potential for patents to be used
without their consent, they may follow the example of Abbott Laboratories, which
decided to divest from the Thai market awaiting national patent system reform.152
Abbott withdrew seven pending patent registration applications for new medicines
in Thailand in response to compulsory licensing.153 As a result of the withdrawal
of investment within these countries, citizens will suffer because hesitant
pharmaceutical companies may no longer wish to invest or introduce new and
useful medicines.154
B. Significance of Article 31bis
With the addition of Article 31bis155 and the statement on the
implementation of the Doha Declaration, 156 parameters for the issuance of
compulsory licenses are increasingly unclear. The Doha Declaration stood for the
proposition that developing nations who are unable to manufacture
pharmaceuticals should be authorized to import generic versions of drugs from
nations with more developed manufacturing capabilities. 157 In addition to the
obvious issues relating to dilution of investment, another problem with importing
generic drugs under a compulsory license is that the drugs likely would originate
from countries such as India and China, 158 which have limited quality-control
inspection abilities.159 These potentially unsafe generic drugs can cause serious
harm when they enter into a market and become hard to control.160
i. Broad deference
Article 31bis affirms that “[e]ach [WTO] member has the right to determine
what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme
urgency.”161 This language is problematic because it gives wide discretion to each
WTO member to decide under which circumstances a compulsory license may be
151

Montlake, supra note 147, at 5.
See Abbott Press Release, supra note 141.
Savoie, supra note 70, at 219.
154
See Zolotaryova, supra note 137, at 110.
155
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39.
156
Doha Declaration, supra note 40.
157
Id. It should be noted that the original TRIPS agreement was in fact initiated for opposite
purposes – namely to protect the intellectual property rights of international investors whose rights were
not being sufficiently protected by developing countries. Id.
158
Marc Kaufman, FDA Scrutiny Scant in India, China as Drugs Pour into U.S., WASH. POST, June
17, 2007, http://www.nipcweb.com/FDA_Scrutiny_%20India_China.pdf (noting that since 2001 India
and China have become major suppliers in the international generic drug market).
159
Id. (noting that quality-control inspections are rarely conducted by the Food and Drug
Administrations in India and China. For comparison, in 2005, the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) conducted over 1,200 quality inspections in the United States, but only 200 inspections were
done in China and India in the last seven years.)
160
Id.
161
Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at para. 5(c).
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appropriate.162 The amendment also claims that it is “understood that public health
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.”163 The terms “national emergency” and “circumstances of extreme
urgency” have been used to describe a variety of situations within countries
wishing to issue a compulsory license.164 While the WTO has recognized that a
national emergency may include public health crises such as AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria, there is no clear definition or standard for determining which other
emergencies would justify the issuance of a compulsory license.165 While any of
these listed emergencies may create a legitimate need for intervention, the trend
has been toward issuing compulsory licenses to countries suffering from diseases
treatable through preventative measures, such as some cardiovascular diseases.166
For example, the WHO has recognized that obesity has reached “epidemic”
proportions in many Western countries, while also acknowledging that obesity is
best treated through changes in diet and exercise. 167 If cardiovascular diseases are
most effectively treated through lifestyle changes, there should not be a way for
compulsory licenses to be issued for cardiovascular medications merely for cost
saving purposes. Such naivety cloaked in good will creates an atmosphere where
countries are able to abuse the system in order to obtain cheaper drugs, even when
there is no clear and immediate need.
ii. Re-exportation
This broad deference given to WTO member countries under Article 31bis,
also allows re-exportation among members of a regional trade agreement and
raises potential public policy concerns by creating ulterior anti-competitive
motives for countries to issue compulsory licenses. 168 If a country is a member to
a regional trade agreement, Article 31bis waives the requirements that the
compulsory license be predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
country granting the license.169 The amendment thus allows members of a
regional trade agreement who import generic drugs under a compulsory license to
also export them to other states so long as those states suffer from the same
medical problems.170 While the proposed amendment states that “[i]t is
understood that this will not prejudice the territorial nature of the patent rights in
question,” the amendment fails to outline detailed requirements for countries privy
to a regional trade before becoming eligible to receive imports under the

162
See Jamie Feldman, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current Practice, 8 J. INT’L
BUS. & L. 137, 142-43 (explaining the dangers of compulsory licensing abuse).
163
See Doha Declaration, supra note 40.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5.
167
Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://
www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/en/index.html.
168
Doha Declaration, supra note 40.
169
Id.
170
Id.
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compulsory license.171 Leaving these kinds of requirements to the discretion of
each country further expands the scope of Article 31 and diminishes the capacity
for the patent owner to profit in foreign markets, ultimately leading to a decrease in
foreign investment.172 Without detailed provisions on the circumstances in which
a compulsory license can be issued, there is a risk that countries participating in
regional trade agreements will be able to siphon off generic pharmaceuticals
without showing true need.
iii. Adequate Remuneration
Lastly, adequate remuneration for the patent owner under a compulsory
license is a problem because only the exporting country is responsible for payment
under Article 31bis.173 Because two countries are involved, both the exporting
country and the importing country, the responsibility should be borne by both
parties. This deference to WTO members is far too broad, and will allow countries
to claim circumstances requiring issuance of compulsory licenses without adequate
need or an analysis of the situation by a neutral third party. The United States
joined with thirty-two other countries in agreeing not to use the Article 31bis
amendment as an importing member because of the need to protect investments
from unauthorized usage.174 This is the correct approach to protect long-term
goals of innovation within the pharmaceutical industry.
V. SUGGESTED REFORMATION OF ARTICLE 31 AND POTENTIAL CLAIMS FOR
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
The history of the TRIPS Agreement negotiations reveal that, behind the
language of Article 31, are two basic rationales for government intervention: to
safeguard against a severe epidemic and to ensure the proper functioning of the
markets.175 These are legitimate goals, but the ends do not justify the means if
there is inconsistency in interpretation of the standards. While the WTO continues
to amend its compulsory licensing statute, foreign governments should consider
alternatives to compelling a patent against the will of the patent owner. Investors
should also consider new methods of patent protection and dispute settlement
under BITs in international arbitration.
171
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Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5.
173
Doha Declaration, supra note 40.
174
Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 158 n.86. The countries other than the United States that agreed
not to use Article 31bis as an importing member include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Id. With the
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Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Id.
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See Anthony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: “Adequate Remuneration” for Non-Voluntary Patent
Licensing, 11:4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 947 n.91 (2008) (noting that during the TRIPS Agreement
negotiations, members of the Swiss Delegation suggested that compulsory licenses may be needed to
serve overriding public interests, such as in the case of a health epidemic, or to safeguard the proper
functioning of the markets by overriding the temporary monopoly of a patent holder who is withholding
use entirely).
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A. Alternatives to Compulsory Licenses
i. Anticipating Volatility
Some pharmaceutical firms are beginning to lower drug prices for poorer
nations, hoping to smooth access to faster-growing emerging markets, and make
up for sluggish growth in the United States, Japan and Europe. 176 Taking
alternative measures to increase access to medicines may be a proactive step
pharmaceutical companies can take to avoid the harsh consequences of compulsory
licensing. For example, GlaxoSmithKline and Sanofi-Aventis have both promised
to cut prices in some developing countries, selling at half or a quarter of the price
they are receiving in the developed world.177 These price-cuts provide a better
way for markets to work, and yet still supply those in need with the most cutting
edge medications.
Similarly, China is facing new challenges in the area of pharmaceutical
patent protection. In 2009, China’s State Intellectual Property Office issued more
than 580,000 patents – up forty-one percent from a year earlier.178 This large
increase in innovation resulted in substantial revisions to China’s national patent
laws.179 Because of the perception of weak international patent protection, China’s
new laws have been criticized as being overly protectionist, granting more patents
to national companies and discriminating against foreign companies wishing to
invest in China’s growing economy. 180 Additionally, United States companies like
Pfizer, who have significant research and development investments in China, may
be negatively impacted by the new regulations, which force patent holders to
license their patents to other producers if patents aren’t “fully exploited” or if
patent owners are deemed to be using the patents in an anti-competitive manner.181
It is unclear how China will determine whether a patent is being misused, or how
much patent owners will be paid if they are forced to license their patent under a
compulsory license.182 This recent example from China shows how changes in
national patent law might be in conflict with the TRIPS Article 31 requirements,
176

Ben Hirschler, “Silent Pandemic” Will Force Drug Price Rethink, (Jan. 20, 2010) http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60J36O20100120 (explaining that “Drugs for diseases which were
previously dominant only in the rich, well-fed world, such as diabetes, heart disease and cancer, are
increasingly in demand in poorer nations in Asia and Africa, whose populations are now living
longer”). Worth noting is the author’s warning of the compulsory licensing systems’ effect on
competition, suggesting that when countries:
[d]iscount[] prices for poorer countries, a move already made by some big drug
firms…pharmaceutical bosses will also be under pressure to join patent pools to
promote downward price pressure on drugs for major chronic diseases by
increasing the number of producers, and may face legal challenges to force them
to allow in more generic competition.
Id.
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Id.
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Loretta Chao, China Issued a Record Number of Patents in 2009, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2010,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527/.
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Id.
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Id. China’s new laws will allow China to issue a compulsory license if the government decides
that a patent is being underutilized. Id.
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and provides an example of the need for a more protective and predictable system
worldwide.183
ii. Patent Linkage
Patent linkage is another option that large pharmaceutical companies like
Bayer have utilized. Patent linkage occurs where a country’s food and drug
regulatory arm is petitioned to agree to an order delaying the introduction of a
generic version of a patented drug until the expiration of the original drug’s
patent.184 While linkage strategies will create better protection for patent holders,
the practice is generally seen by public health activists as a hostile attempt to
prevent generic medicines from reaching those who need them most.185 A more
effective method might be for pharmaceutical companies to work with generic
drug manufacturers within developing countries to prevent the need for
compulsory licensing while remaining profitable. 186 If pharmaceutical companies
take the lead on creating legitimate generic medicines, these drugs will more likely
reach those who need them, thus preventing the threat of a compulsory license, and
allowing patent holders to retain control.
B. Recommendations: WTO Amendments
Given the current potential for misuse of the compulsory licensing law as
well as the difficulties faced by countries with legitimate need but with no
manufacturing capabilities of their own, other options could be suitably explored
so as to attain proper balance between the humanitarian efforts and competitive
needs of the pharmaceutical sectors in developing countries. Contrary to the belief
of many humanitarian activists, there is no evidence that an overly protective IP
policy necessarily will lead to less competition.187 Statistical analysis of modern
trends in foreign investment reveals that the more protections and incentives
countries give to innovators, the more likely they are to invest time and money
discovering new life-saving medications.188 While bringing the fruits of
183

Jingyuan Sun, China’s State Council Publishes New Implementing Rules for the New Patent
Law, LEXOLOGY, Jan. 22, 2010, available at http:www.lexology.com/library/.
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Priyanka Golikeri, While Bayer Pushes Patent, EU Parliamentary Group Opposes, DNA INDIA,
(Feb. 16, 2010) http://www. dnaindia.com/money/report_while-bayer-pushes-patent-eu-parliamentarygroup-opposes_1348342 (explaining that a European parliamentary group is planning to call on the EU
and European Commission, the executive arm of the EU, to not push for provisions such as patent
linkage in developing countries).
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The Pharma Letter, Bayer’s Patent Linkage Appeal to be Heard by India’s Supreme Court,
(Mar. 2010) http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/28478/bayers-patent-linkage-appeal-to-be-heard-byindias-supreme-court.html.
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William O. Duperon, Global Competition Versus Regional Interests: FDI and Pharmaceuticals
in India, 5 J. INT’L L. & TECH. (2010) (noting that by working to promote legitimate generic drugs (as
opposed to forced compulsory licensing), the “progression of the pharmaceutical industry into generic
markets may present the possibility of patent protection and affordable drugs coexisting”).
187
See Arnold, supra note 3, at 3.
188
Greve, supra note 79. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70 (1969)
(explaining that patent systems and the protection they provide create incentives to innovate by
conferring monopoly power for a limited time).
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pharmaceutical innovation to the wider public is a noble pursuit, the WTO
compulsory licensing scheme, as it is today, is not a balanced answer. There must
be reform to ensure that patent owners are protected and innovators have
incentives to continue creating the life-saving medications our world needs.
i. Moderated Deference
First, the resulting amendment from the Doha Declaration - Article 31bis essentially allows WTO members complete discretion in determining whether to
grant a compulsory license.189 Instead of paving an avenue for potential abuse, the
WTO should set guidelines for determining whether a country is legitimately
suffering a “national emergency” or “circumstance of extreme urgency.”
Additionally, the decision of whether a WTO member state is actually
encountering a national emergency or circumstance of extreme urgency should not
rest solely in the hands of the country issuing the compulsory license. Rather, it
should rest with a WTO commission that has experience and can work with the
nation to take an unbiased look at their situation, and make a decision as to
whether there is legitimate need for a compulsory license to be issued.
Furthermore, Article 31(b) should be amended to include detailed
descriptions of the circumstances under which its exceptions should apply. As
written, Article 31(b) waives the requirement that there be reasonable negotiations
with the patent owner under circumstances of ‘national emergency,’ ‘other
circumstances of extreme urgency,’ or ‘public non-commercial use.’190 It is
unclear under Article 31(b) whether these terms are to be read in the conjunctive or
whether any of the three would fulfill the requirements and activate the waiver of
reasonable negotiations.191 Without clear definitions from the WTO of these
terms, and authentication from the WTO on all decisions regarding “national
emergenc[ies],” “extreme urgency,” and “public non-commercial use,” countries
will increasingly be able to issue compulsory licenses for any type of drug, and for
any perceived need.
ii. Price Reduction
The need to provide more affordable pharmaceuticals has been addressed by
both private pharmaceutical producers and countries wishing to provide better
healthcare to their citizens. GlaxoKlineSmith has taken a unique approach to the
problem by taking the offense in trying to provide greater access to medicines in
poor countries.192 The company plans to create a patent pool for tropical diseases,
reinvest twenty percent of profits from medicines sold in least developed countries,
and reduce prices in those countries by seventy-five percent.193 Whether
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TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39 art. 31(b).
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GalxoKlineSmith’s plan is partially a public relations ploy to undo negative public
perception about large pharmaceutical companies, or a response to threats of
monetary losses through compulsory licenses, the new proposals set the stage for a
sea change in the way pharmaceutical companies operate under current
international protections.
Similarly, the governments of some countries are attempting to intervene in
the free market to provide cheaper drugs for their citizens. 194 The Philippine
government has been increasingly pushing for drug companies to voluntarily halve
the prices on a series of life-saving medications.195 Officials at the Philippines
Department of Health have targeted twenty drugs, which cost two to three times
more than in some other Asian countries, as potential candidates for the
program.196 Last August, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroya imposed
mandatory price controls on a number of hypertension and cancer medications, all
of which were produced by companies from the United States. 197 The choice to
rely on a law enacted in 2008, allows the Philippine government to impose price
controls to force drug manufacturers into voluntarily lowering prices. 198 This case
in the Philippines is an example of how some countries are trying alternatives to
compulsory licensing to lower prices. Whether these and other alternatives will
eventually deter investors is yet to be seen.
C. The Use of Bilateral Investment Treaties for United States Investors
Abroad
i. General Considerations
American pharmaceutical producers investing abroad will benefit by
familiarizing themselves with licensing policy developments, as these investors are
the parties who will be most significantly impacted.199 One huge policy
development is the increased use of BITs between nations wishing to increase
trade and create better investment protection.200 Most BITs provide that disputes
between an investor and the host state can be settled in arbitration, and can provide
additional protection not found in the vague language of the WTO’s TRIPS Article
31.201 Protection under the terms of a BIT mean the difference between having to
194
James Hookway, Philippines Seeks Voluntary Drug-Price Cuts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2010,
available at http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870362660457.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id. The Philippines, a country of ninety-million people, has been influenced in 2010 by
upcoming presidential elections, where making medications more affordable is a key issue for the
outgoing political party. Id.
198
Id.
199
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 484 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the
expansion of patent-based investments abroad and their unique susceptibility to changes in compulsory
licensing policy).
200
See Franck, supra note 99, at 1522 (noting that in the past twelve years, countries have entered
into approximately 1500 new bilateral investment treaties in order to attract foreign investors and create
flexibility in the resolution of investment disputes).
201
Id. This additional protection, above and beyond that found in the WTO framework is often
referred to as “TRIPS-plus.” Id. Most BITs contain arbitration provisions allowing for private
arbitration should a dispute arise relating to the investment. Id.
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wait on a lengthy process under the WTO’s settlement procedures, or being able to
bring a case directly against a foreign government in investor-state arbitration
under the terms of the BIT.202 Additionally, a BIT provides the opportunity for
two countries to negotiate for protection above and beyond that provided under
multilateral treaties like the WTO.203
It is important for investors to know that virtually all BITs contain provisions
on expropriation in closely parallel if not identical wording. 204 Since a compulsory
license does not actually take away the legal title from the patent holder, investors
will not have a claim for direct expropriation, but they may have a claim for
indirect expropriation if their property right is diminished substantially - the effects
of which would be tantamount to full expropriation. 205 It is generally recognized
in international law that regulatory actions taken by a state government can
interfere with privately held property rights to such an extent that these rights are
rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated – even
though the WTO member state does not intend to expropriate the rights and the
legal title to the property formally remains with the original patent owner.206
Intellectual property scholars Jan Paulsson and Zachary Douglas have written
extensively on the area of indirect expropriation and suggest two stages of
analysis, first looking at the magnitude of the interference to the property right, and
second to whether that interference rises to the level of expropriation as referenced
in the treaty.207 In Christopher Gibson’s article Compulsory Licensing: The Case
of Indirect Expropriation he suggests analyzing a third factor, namely the character
and motive behind the regulatory government action on a case-by-case basis.208
These three factors have been incorporated into Annex B of the U.S. Model BIT
for determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred under the terms of
the BIT.209 In theory, as Paulson, Douglas and Gibson explain, these factors
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would be sufficient for a finding of indirect expropriation in the case of a
compulsory license, however in practice the BITs using this language could be
improved to create even greater protection for investors abroad.210
First, BITs should not merely reference the WTO standards as a minimum
baseline.211 As Gibson points out, there has been a trend in recent U.S. BITs to
incorporate the WTO Article 31 standards directly into the expropriation
analysis.212 One example of this trend is found in the recent U.S.-Uruguay BIT.213
While the U.S.-Uruguay BIT includes the helpful three-factor analysis from the
U.S. Model BIT, it also includes a provision excluding the possibility that a
compulsory license could amount to expropriation so long as the license is in
accordance with the TRIPS Agreement standards. 214 This provision essentially
incorporates the WTO standards into the BIT, which can prove to be problematic
given the ambiguous nature of Article 31. 215 Moreover, merely incorporating the
standards from Article 31 will not provide any additional protection for
investors.216 Under this framework, so long as a compulsory license is Article 31
compliant, it will not violate the terms of the BIT. A better idea would be to
include a provision that specifically relates to when a compulsory license will be
allowed and under what terms, allowing tribunals to focus on a more
comprehensive set of factors for determining whether an indirect expropriation
occurred.217
Second, while the three-factor analysis of an indirect expropriation provides
some guidance for tribunals, it pales in comparison to the detail provided for in

(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an
action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic
value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect
expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
Id. at Annex B, para. 4.
211
Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4,
2005, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Uruguay.pdf [hereinafter U.S.Uruguay BIT].
212
See Gibson, Compulsory License, supra note 208, at 396-97 (analyzing significant developments
in the U.S.-Uruguay BIT, which incorporates the standards set forth in Article 31).
213
See U.S.-Uruguay BIT supra, note 211.
214
Id. at 397. The relevant portion of the U.S.-Uruguay BIT reads: “to the extent that a compulsory
license is TRIPS Agreement compliant, the expropriation provisions in…[the] U.S.-Uruguay BIT will
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Article 31.218 Thus, inclusion of standards for what constitutes a national
emergency, who makes those decisions, and analysis of a contracting state’s socioeconomic status would go a long way toward ensuring that patents are protected
from unfounded and abusive compulsory licensing. 219 Additionally, adequate
remuneration standards in United States BITs should take into account the full
“market value” of the investment, not just the “economic value” as required by
Article 31 and many of the currently existing BITs.220 By considering the
economic status of the country seeking a compulsory license, existence of
legitimate need, as well as any offers to reduce purchase price, a tribunal will have
a better chance of coming to a balanced decision on whether expropriation has
occurred.221
Lastly, to insure protection under BITs entered into by the United States, the
treaties should be renegotiated to provide more detail and much needed guidance
for investors on how the standard should be applied in a case against a government
issuing a compulsory license.222 It has been observed that this lack of clear
guidance on what regulatory actions amount to indirect expropriation can make
arbitration under modern BITs regarding compulsory licenses particularly
tricky.223 Regardless, given the potential to resolve disputes quickly and ensure
protection, measures to increase the applicability of BIT’s should be seriously
considered. Indeed, it is surprising that the United States has entered into
relatively few BITs compared to other countries. 224
While the use of BITs to protect against misuses of the compulsory licensing
mechanism seems ideal, the high degree of deprivation needed to support a claim
for indirect expropriation, as it is currently defined in many BITs, makes the
possibility of fully protecting patent rights on this basis unrealistic.
Pharmaceutical companies should place a renewed emphasis on urging the United
States Trade Representative to renegotiate current BITs to specifically define
parameters for indirect expropriation in the case of a compulsory license.
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ii. Practical Guidance for Investors
When considering whether a claim for indirect expropriation exists under a
BIT, investors should undertake a two-part analysis.225 First, “the analysis should
focus on the nature or magnitude of the interference to the investor’s property
interest in the investment caused by measures attributable to the Host State to
determine whether those actions amount to a taking.” 226 Second, “there should be
a determination of whether this taking or interference rises to the level of an
expropriation by reference to the relevant treaty standard.” 227 This analysis is
similar to the factors set out in the United States Model BIT, which contains
provisions about whether the economic impact of government action amounts to
expropriation.228
During the first stage of analysis, investors should realize that a compulsory
license has the potential to undercut one of the fundamental incentives of an
intellectual property investment – namely the right to exclusive patent usage within
the foreign market.229 At worst, a compulsory license could substantially affect the
ability of pharmaceutical producers to turn a profit, thus significantly reducing the
value of the investment. Thus, it has been observed that there is an obvious
assumption the issuance of a compulsory license can “cause an adverse effect on
the economic value of a patented product and interfere with the patent holder’s
ability to use or enjoy its patent in a given market.”230 However, the extent of
interference will be dependent upon the compulsory license’s terms, including the
duration and length of the license, any subsequent remuneration to be paid to the
investor owning the patent, and whether the parties authorized by the government
to make use of the patent actually turn a profit from the license. 231 A traditional
analysis of a taking in the direct expropriation context requires that there be a
“substantial deprivation” to the investor.232 However, any one of these factors
alone will not always be determinative, but rather they should be weighed in the
totality. For example, if an investor is offered a low level of compensation under a
compulsory license and the parties authorized by the government to use the
compulsory license are in fact making a huge profit, there is a greater likelihood
that a “taking” has occurred.233 By considering the practical effects of compulsory
licensing, including a comprehensive valuation of the investment, international
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arbitral tribunals confronted with an investor-state dispute should be well equipped
to determine whether an indirect taking has occurred. 234
The second stage of analysis requires the investor to ask whether the taking
is sufficient to constitute an indirect expropriation. To determine if an indirect
expropriation has occurred, international tribunals will consider (1) specific
representations or actions regarding a promise of protection on the part of the
foreign government, and (2) legitimate or reasonable expectations and reliance on
the part of the investor.235 A situation in which both factors exist, presents a
significantly different scenario from one in which no state representations or
promises of protection are made to the investor directly. 236 One such example of
the former would be where some facially non-discriminatory legislation is passed,
such as an increase in economic regulation, in which an investor may have no
legitimate expectation of an unchanging government regulatory structure. 237
Without some additional representation of patent protection from the state, an
investor would have a hard time arguing indirect expropriation under the BIT, and
would have a better chance pursuing a claim through the WTO framework,
challenging the issuance of the compulsory license directly instead of seeking a
settlement award in arbitration. This use of BIT arbitration is still evolving, but a
careful analysis of the above factors, in conjunction with the possibility of future
health crises, drug pricing and other market considerations, an investor should
have a better chance of preserving her investment and saving money down the
road.
Before investing internationally, pharmaceutical companies should consider
asking questions of a foreign government’s patent office about what kinds of
protection they can expect, and inquire as to whether or not the granting of patent
rights for a particular pharmaceutical qualifies as the type of representation or
action toward the investor that will be recognized within the indirect expropriation
context. Investors should also consider whether it is reasonable for them to rely on
the foreign government’s grant of patent protection throughout the term, especially
if the pharmaceutical company anticipates any intermittent usage periods during
the life of the patent.238 Additionally, investors should take care to observe what
posture a country has taken toward other foreign investors in the past, and make
decisions accordingly to fully protect their investments from expropriation.
Lastly, investors should also consider the national patent law of a country in
which they are considering an investment and inquire into whether there is a
provision regulating compulsory licenses. In most cases, these national laws will
provide the terms under which a compulsory license may be granted by the
234
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government.239 Thus, for an investor, reasonable investment-backed expectations
should include the investor’s knowledge of the foreign state’s patent law system.
With the increasing likelihood of a compulsory license being issued under the
vague terms of Article 31, investors should consider whether a national patent law
allowing increased relaxation of patent protection fundamentally undermines the
stability of the patent such that complete reliance by the investor would be
unreasonable.240
Moreover, to the extent that a country’s national patent law, or government’s
authorization of a compulsory license is inconsistent with international law, the
patent owner, as a foreign investor, may also take into account that it is able to
claim rights under international standards through either the WTO system or
investment arbitration under a BIT.241 While there are many factors that can be
used to determine whether indirect expropriation has occurred, these factors should
provide an adequate framework for guiding tribunals when considering a
government’s authorization of a compulsory license.
VI. CONCLUSION
Compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents takes on a particularly
controversial nature. On the one hand pharmaceutical companies are confronted
by serious pressures to extend good will from countries faced with legitimate
public health concerns, on the other are the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of a patent-based investment rooted in an applicable BIT, national, or
international patent laws such as the WTO. With worldwide adoption of an
increasingly expansive view of compulsory licensing in the name of public health,
there are now good reasons for pharmaceutical companies who are considering
investing abroad to explore the potential for dispute settlement either directly
under a BIT or through WTO arbitration.
The main issues regarding compulsory licenses are centered around the
question of how much latitude governments should be given to take actions that
may interfere with intellectual property investments, whether these actions erode
the standards of protection established for investors under national patent laws and
BITs, and whether such measures are consistent with the requirements set forth in
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Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Because the WTO framework serves as a
baseline, the standards should be clear and comprehensive. The realized benefits,
in extreme circumstances, that compulsory licenses are meant to provide, are
slowly becoming sidelined by a trend toward manipulating the vague language of
TRIPS in order to compel licenses for any reason. The language of TRIPS,
specifically the amendment Article 31bis, needs to create consistent protection for
foreign investors. While Article 31bis is currently operational, a 2008 decision
was made to extend the deadline for formally accepting the TRIPS agreement
amendment.242 The deadline was extended until 31 December 2009 or “such later
date as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference,” and has yet to be formally
ratified.243 Any future amendments must incorporate strong IP protection, not just
for its immediate effect, but also for establishing a long-term sustainable minimum
baseline of protection for innovators.
While the usage of BITs to protect foreign direct investment has the potential
to be useful for pharmaceutical companies, the law is still evolving, and there is
little in the way of precedent or guidance on successfully winning a case for
indirect expropriation. Pharmaceutical companies must recognize the continuing
and unresolved conflict between the need for strong patent protection and the need
to remedy future health emergencies. Until the WTO’s Article 31 more
appropriately addresses this balance, pharmaceutical companies will benefit by an
increased focus on working with the United States Trade Representative to amend
current BITs to provide increased guidance on when an indirect expropriation has
occurred. By designing BITs to specifically address indirect expropriation in the
case of a compulsory license issued for pure economic gain, pharmaceutical
companies investing abroad will have more confidence to innovate and continue
foreign investment. If enough BITs reflect this emphasis on increased intellectual
property protection, the WTO might be influenced to make the much-needed
changes to the lenient standards under Article 31.
Until the WTO makes the necessary changes to its compulsory licensing
laws, investors’ main goal for protecting their investment should be to utilize new,
direct means of settlement in an effort to avoid WTO arbitration, or for the time
being to reconsider investing in certain countries altogether.
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